FCC10: July 20

6th Workshop on Formal and Computational Cryptography

associated with CSF


Since the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols and systems that rely on cryptography. One of the approaches is based on a computational model that considers issues of computational complexity and probability. Messages are modelled as bitstrings and security properties are defined in a strong form, in essence guaranteeing security with overwhelming probability against all probabilistic polynomial-time attacks. However, it is difficult to prove security of large, complex protocols in this model. The other approach relies on a symbolic model of protocol execution in which messages are modelled using a term algebra and cryptographic primitives are treated as perfect black-boxes, e.g. the only way to decrypt a ciphertext is to use the corresponding decryption key. This abstraction enables significantly simpler and often automated analysis of complex protocols. Since this model places strong constraints on the attacker, a fundamental question is whether such an analysis implies the strong security properties defined in the computational model.

This workshop focuses on approaches that combine and relate symbolic and computational protocol analysis. Over the last few years, there has been a spate of research results in this area. One set of results establish correspondence theorems between the two models, in effect showing that, for a certain class of protocols and properties, security in the symbolic model implies security in the computational model. In other work, researchers use language-based techniques such as process calculi, type systems, and protocol logics to reason directly about the computational model. Finally, several projects are investigating ways of mechanizing computationally sound proofs of cryptographic mechanisms. The workshop seeks results in this area of computationally sound protocol analysis: foundations and tools.

More information can be found here.


Program Chairs

C├ędric Fournet, Microsoft Research, United Kingdom

Program Committee:

Martin Abadi, Microsoft Research and UCSC, United States
Hubert Comon-Lundh, ENS Cachan, France
Ralf Kuesters, University of Trier, Germany
Yassine Lakhnech, University of Grenoble,Verimag, France
Dominique Unruh, Saarland University, Germany
Bogdan Warinschi, University of Bristol, United Kingdom